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The original function of constitutional adjudication is to protect and 
enforce the constitution against unconstitutional laws. Nevertheless, 
nowadays constitutional courts are important elements of the system of 
the protection of fundamental rights, as well. In harmony with the topic 
of the workshop,1 we approach constitutional adjudication from the 
viewpoint of citizens who are the holders of fundamental rights. According 
to the European (Austrian–German) model of constitutional adjudication, 
citizens can mainly play a role as initiators (and not as parties as it is 
typical of contradictory judicial proceedings) in the procedures of the 
constitutional courts. The constitutional changes in Hungary (the new 
Fundamental Law and the new Act on the Constitutional Court) make 
this viewpoint particularly topical since the citizens’ role – being realized 
mainly in initiating the procedures – is going through an essential change. 
Until the end of 011 citizens were entitled to initiate abstract constitutional 
review on the basis of so-called actio popularis – without any specific 
personal legal interest. From 01, according to the new Fundamental 
Law, on the one hand, the actio popularis will be abolished; on the other 
hand, the so-called German-type constitutional complaint procedure will 
1 This article is the written version of a paper presented at the International Workshop on Human 
Rights Enforcement Mechanisms, Faculty of Law of ELTE University, Budapest, Hungary, 5 
November 011.
 In 011, a new constitution called Fundamental Law and also a new Act on the Constitutional 
Court (Act CLI of 011, hereinafter: HCC Act) were adopted by the two-third governing ma-
jority of the Hungarian Parliament. The Fundamental Law and the new act implementing the 
new constitution entered into force on the 1st of January, 01.
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be introduced. The latter entitles citizens to initiate a procedure only in 
case of a specific infringement of their fundamental rights, however, it can 
be initiated also against the application of the law, and the decision of the 
Constitutional Court serves as a ground for the review of the judgement 
passed in the concrete case.
The aim of this paper is to analyse and to evaluate this change from the 
viewpoint of the protection of fundamental rights. How will this change 
of citizens’ role influence the protection of fundamental rights? As a first 
step, we point out that among the competences of constitutional courts 
the protection of fundamental rights is served not exclusively by the 
constitutional complaint. After that, we draw attention to the fact that the 
main function of the constitutional complaint is not the enforcement of 
individual fundamental rights by the citizens concerned.
I.  The protection of fundamental rights by constitutional courts
The essence of constitutional adjudication is the judicial enforcement of the 
constitution against statutory law found to be in conflict with the provisions 
of the constitution. In Europe and in the CEE region the dominant means 
of constitutional adjudication is the abstract review of the law. As for 
the other forms of constitutional review, in addition to this, most of the 
constitutional courts exercise the power of concrete review initiated by 
ordinary courts, and as a special form of concrete review, some of them3 
examine constitutional complaints filed against the law (‘quasi’ constitutional 
complaint). The speciality of the two latter forms is the fact that the decision 
of the constitutional court may have an effect on the concrete case in which 
the judge or the citizen realized the unconstitutionality of the law, but 
the constitutional function of these procedures remains to invalidate the 
unconstitutional laws. In some European countries the main function of the 
constitutional court (the protection and enforcement of the constitution) is 
supplemented by a function serving a more direct protection of fundamental 
rights in the form of the ‘real’ constitutional complaint procedure.4
3 E.g. the Polish and, until 011, the Hungarian Constitutional Court.
4 Such a power is allocated to the constitutional courts of Germany, the Czech Republic, Croatia 
and Slovenia.
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As a further starting point, the notion of the protection of fundamental 
rights has to be defined. In a narrow sense, it means the judicial enforcement 
of individual fundamental rights by citizens concerned which is also the 
indispensable constitutional minimum of the protection of fundamental 
rights. In a broader sense, it also covers quasi judicial procedures (such 
as the complaint-handling mechanism of ombudsman institutions), 
monitoring and advising activities not requiring a specific infringement of 
fundamental rights, and what’s more, any sort of the promotion of human 
rights (such as awareness raising). As for this latter sense, we would like 
to distinguish between the two aspects of the protection of fundamental 
rights. The subjective aspect means the enforcement of fundamental rights 
by citizens concerned in judicial or quasi judicial (e.g. ombudsman-type) 
proceedings in a specific case. The objective protection of fundamental 
rights includes, on the one hand, the further effects of the aforementioned 
proceedings which extend beyond the specific case. On the other hand, 
it also covers additional mechanisms or activities, the goal of which is 
protecting and promoting fundamental rights, even in lack of a concrete 
infringement of a subjective fundamental right of a concrete person, 
mainly with a preventive goal and frequently in a proactive way.
Regarding the competences of constitutional courts in the light of the 
notion of the protection of fundamental rights, it is undoubted that the 
constitutional complaint procedure has the most direct relationship with 
and influence on the concrete infringements of fundamental rights. One of 
its main effects is the remedy of the concrete grievance: it is initiated by 
the citizen concerned as a legal remedy after the proceeding of ordinary 
courts, and it makes a ground for the revision of the concrete judgement 
of ordinary courts. However, defining the protection of fundamental rights 
in a broader sense and taking into consideration the notion of the objective 
protection, constitutional review procedures (including abstract review) 
also perform a function of the protection of fundamental rights. Their 
inherent aim is not the remedy of the concrete infringement of a subjective 
fundamental right, but they (indirectly) contribute to the protection of 
fundamental rights. 
98 BERNADETTE SOMODY and BEATRIX VISSY
II.  The consequences of the abolition of the actio popularis
Taking into consideration the latter statement, the question comes up: 
will the abolition of the right of citizens not concerned in a concrete case 
to initiate an abstract constitutional review of laws affect the protection 
of fundamental rights to a significant extent? We attempt to answer 
this question on the grounds of the Hungarian experiences of the actio 
popularis. The actio popularis and the abstract review of the laws on this 
basis proved to be a pretty characteristic feature and a successful means of 
the Hungarian model of constitutional adjudication in the last twenty years 
in qualitative as well as in quantitative terms.5  As for launching the abstract 
review procedure, however, the Hungarian regulation was categorized as 
one of the broadest ones, which provides for a virtually unlimited access. 
Referring to the workload caused by this possibility, the new Fundamental 
Law restricted the access to the Hungarian Constitutional Court which 
from 01 is limited to the Government, a one-forth minority of the MPs 
and the ombudsman.6
The abolition of the actio popularis will transform the range of the 
cases before the Constitutional Court. First of all, several types of cases 
cannot be brought before the Constitutional Court by citizens. As for the 
subject matter, according to the new regulation citizens cannot turn to the 
Constitutional Court in cases related to the principles of state organization, 
state organs and even the objective aspect of fundamental rights which 
may have an indirect fundamental right significance, but are not in a direct 
relationship with an enforceable subjective right of a citizen. As for persons 
concerned, by abolishing the actio popularis, the human rights NGOs’ 
ability of initiating the procedure of the Constitutional Court will be also 
abolished, so the chance of bringing the problems of vulnerable groups 
5 It should be noted that citizens have made a pivotal contribution to the Hungarian democrati-
zation in general, and to the entrenchment of human rights in particular. The introduction of 
judicial review of administrative decisions as well as the abolition of death penalty were the 
results of actio popularis. This legal tool was the vehicle for the development of numerous 
constitutional standards regarding the whole range of fundamental freedoms, such as the con-
ception of the right to the protection of personal data as a right to informational self-determina-
tion, the constitutional requirement stipulating that public figures must tolerate even sharp and 
degrading criticism etc.
6 Art. 4 par. () point e) of the Fundamental Law of Hungary.
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(e.g. children, homeless or Roma people) before the Court will decrease 
as well. The cases in which a concrete person could be concerned, will 
reach the Constitutional Court later: basically after a final judgement of 
ordinary courts and this way after the occurrence of the violation of a 
fundamental right. 
Hence it follows that we may lose by the abolition of the actio popularis. 
Can this restriction be counterbalanced by other changes or new 
possibilities?
Besides the ombudsman, only governmental units are entitled to initiate 
the abstract review procedure: the Government and a one-forth minority 
of the MPs (currently the latter would need the cooperation of all the 
opposition parliamentary groups, including the extreme right wing party), 
which is a rather restrictive regulation also in a European comparison. What 
has more importance from our viewpoint is the fact that these initiators 
have a political nature so they are likely to take advantage of starting a 
procedure to reach their political goals, and not to promote fundamental 
rights.7 Partly due to the proposal of the Venice Commission,8 besides the 
initiators of a political nature (the government or the opposition parties) the 
ombudsman (the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights) will be entitled 
to initiate an abstract constitutional review procedure. Will he/she be able 
to replace the actio popularis in functional terms? Generally ombudsman 
institutions, as a typical sort of national human rights institutions, can 
play a significant role in the objective protection of fundamental rights, 
so they may seem as a competent and effective mediator between 
the civil society and the Constitutional Court. The ombudsman is an 
expert on and also a champion of fundamental rights who can function 
as a filter helping to reduce the workload of the Constitutional Court. 
However, there are several counterarguments against the success of the 
7 A German commentator remarked on the consequences of the range of initiators being of a 
political nature that “... the apparent manipulation of the judicial process for political purposes 
has led some observers to favour the abolition of abstract judicial review”. See Donald P. Kom-
mers: The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany. Durham and 
London, Duke University Press, 1997, p. 8.
8  Opinion on three legal questions arising in the process of drafting the New Constitution of 
Hungary – Adopted by the Venice Commission at its 86th Plenary Session (Venice, 5–6 
March 011), Section 66.
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replacement. Following from his function and scope of competence, he 
as the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights could be entitled to initiate 
procedures only on the basis of the fundamental rights provisions of the 
Fundamental Law in his field of competence, namely, in connection with 
state authorities listed in the Act on the Commissioner for Fundamental 
Rights. This interpretation is supported by the fact that, according to the 
new Act on the Constitutional Court,9 the ombudsman himself has to claim 
the unconstitutionality of the actual law. There are also several arguments 
for the interpretation according to which the ombudsman’s submission 
should be based on a concrete case investigated by his office. To sum up, 
the ombudsman’s leeway is pretty restricted.
Analysing the further elements of the new regulation, there comes up the 
question whether the extended preventive review can be ‘an even better 
means’ of the objective protection of fundamental rights. According to 
the new Fundamental Law, in addition to the constitutional veto of the 
President of the Republic, the Parliament will be also authorised to initiate 
a prior constitutional review.10 However, similarly to the abstract review, 
this possibility is more likely to be used as a political weapon than an 
instrument enforcing fundamental rights.
The Hungarian regulation, similarly to the German one, provides for the 
type of constitutional complaint that can be submitted directly against the 
law, however the complainant is required to be affected by the law he/
she complains of, and there cannot be other available legal remedy.11 The 
degree of the similarity between this special form of the constitutional 
complaint and the actio popularis depends on the interpretation of the 
requirement of the victim status. An extensive interpretation may result 
in developing the procedure of actio popularis, at least as regards the acts 
on fundamental rights. To avoid this, the German Federal Constitutional 
Court enforces this criterion very strictly: the complainant has to be 
clearly, directly, and presently affected by the act complained of.1 At the 
9 Art. 4 par. () of the HCC Act.
10 Art. 6 par. () of the Fundamental Law of Hungary.
11 Art. 6 par. () of the HCC Act.
1 Velimir Belajec: Admissibility requirements for constitutional complaints and mechanisms for 
avoiding an excessive caseload. In: The protection of fundamental rights by the constitutional 
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moment, we cannot rely on the practice of the Hungarian Constitutional 
Court, but being aware of the fact that the enormous workload caused by 
the actio popularis was a significant argument for its abolition, it seems to 
be against an extensive interpretation.
To sum it up, from this viewpoint, the possibility and the means of the 
objective and preventive protection of fundamental rights will narrow down. 
Nevertheless, in order to evaluate the changes in a comprehensive way and 
analysing also the aspect of the subjective protection of fundamental rights, 
the reverse side of the coin, namely the introduction of the German-type 
constitutional complaint also has to be taken into consideration.
III.   The function and the characteristics of the constitutional 
complaint
The constitutional complaint is basically conceived as an effective 
instrument aiming for protecting the citizens’ individual rights. And 
indeed the formal appearance of the constitutional complaint procedure 
points towards that this instrument is destined to perform the function of 
subjective fundamental right protection. What are the factors that indicate 
this function? From the individuals’ perspective, the constitutional 
complaint is an extraordinary legal remedy available for any person who 
claims that the state has violated one or more of his fundamental rights, 
and justifies that all other legal remedies proved fruitless. Furthermore, 
the scope of review is quite broad since complaints can be lodged against 
any act of public authorities. Considering the absence of actio popularis, 
the constitutional complaint is the only instrument that directly opens up 
the way of challenging a normative act by individuals. The scope of the 
review upon a constitutional complaint also suggests effectiveness since it 
reaches beyond the original subject matter of constitutional adjudication: 
the constitutional supervision is not restricted to the review for the 
constitutionality of legal norms but also extended to the review for the 
constitutionality of the application of laws by judicial tribunals.  Finally, 
court. Council of Europe, 1995, pp. 146–147. Kommers, ibid 1997, p. 530; Gerrit manssen: 
Staatsrecht II. Grundrechte. Munich, C.H. Beck, 007, 51. 
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the possible outcome of the procedure promises an effective remedy for 
infringements too as the constitutional court is authorised to invalidate any 
law or decision found to be unconstitutional and return the issue back to the 
competent ordinary court for a further decision. Taking into consideration 
all of these characteristics, one cannot deny that the constitutional 
complaint procedure is able to effectively remedy individual fundamental 
right violations, and, by doing so, serves the individual interests of the 
complainant.
But should the redress of subjective right infringements be considered as 
the primary function of the constitutional complaint procedure? 
To evaluate what extent the constitutional complaint procedure is 
aimed at protecting subjective fundamental rights, we need to identify 
such characteristic factors of the complaint which, on the one hand, 
may question or even undermine the strength of the protection of 
individuals by the complaint, or, on the other hand, which massively 
suggest the objective aspect of this procedure. When seeking for these, a 
comprehensive approach is used focusing mainly on the Hungarian and 
German regulation. There are at least two rationales behind the parallel 
examination of these two forms of the constitutional complaint. It can 
be justified partly because, apart from some seemingly minor deviations, 
the regulation of the two institutions greatly converge, and partly because 
the German pattern is had an effect not only on the legislators but also 
the Hungarian Constitutional Court itself. Ever since its establishment in 
1989, the Hungarian Constitutional Court has looked to the jurisdiction of 
its German counterpart as a point of reference when seeking pointers on 
how to decide on concrete cases.
Starting with the factors that relativize the subjective aspect of the 
constitutional complaint, these can be derived from the purpose of keeping 
away or sorting out constitutional complaints. The practical role of these 
factors is to protect the constitutional court from an excessive caseload. 
Indeed, these factors altogether, in our view, also play a role of preventing 
the constitutional court from taking over the place of ordinary courts to 
which the function of subjective right protection is primarily allocated. 
Nevertheless, from citizens’ point of view, these factors necessarily result 
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in a limitation on the right to seek protection for individual fundamental 
rights by submitting a constitutional complaint.
As for the factors that keep away an amount of constitutional complaints 
from the constitutional court, among these the mandatory legal 
representation that is required before the Hungarian Constitutional Court, 
as well as the fine that may be imposed both in Hungary and in Germany 
if the lodging of a constitutional complaint constitutes an abuse, are to be 
emphasized. In addition, to discourage the filing of trivial complaints, in 
Germany, the constitutional court was given the additional authority to 
charge a fee on any petitioner whose complaint it refuses to accept because 
it is either “clearly inadmissible or wholly unlikely to succeed”.13 
Factors aimed at sorting out constitutional complaints are manifested in 
the formal and, even more, in the substantial criteria of filing a complaint 
with the constitutional court. Before the court looks at the merits of the 
case, the constitutional complaint is subjected to a preliminary examination 
procedure in which the court scrutinises whether the initiative meets the 
range of criteria prescribed by the law. This preliminary screening leaves 
a major leeway for the constitutional court to decide on which complaint 
it accepts. Indeed, there are scholars who have argued, that this procedure, 
all in all, shows some likeness to the certiorari jurisdiction of the US 
Supreme Court.14
As for the formal criteria, here we do not refer to those requirements that 
are known as usual and commonly justified restrictions of legal remedies, 
such as the deadline of submission, the precondition of exhausting other 
legal remedies, the obligation to specify the claim, the requirement of 
victim-status etc.  However, the possibility of dismissing the constitutional 
complaint as inadmissible on the basis that the complaint is unclear, 
13 Art. 34a par. 1-3 o the FCC Act. See also Kommers, ibid 1997, p. 19. 
14 Cf. Wolf-Dieter mndler: The American writ of certiorari and the German constitutional com-
plaint with respect to criminal judgments. New York University, School of Law, 1967. And cf. 
also Ralf rogowsKi and Thomas gawron (eds), Constitutional Courts in Comparison. The US. 
Supreme Court and the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany. Berhahn Books, 00, pp. 
8–10, 145–146. 
inconsistent, or it lacks a proper foundation,15 which happens to turn up 
often in the German practice, provides a wide space for the constitutional 
court to refuse complaints behind of which even serious violations of 
fundamental rights can stretch.  It is not without precedent in Germany 
that an inadequate analogy (an improper reference to a decision made by 
the Federal Constitutional Court) drawn by the complainant can lead to 
the dismissal of the constitutional complaint.16
The substantial criteria of the complaint serve as the most convincing 
evidences for proving how accidental the success of the constitutional 
complaints is. To obtain a decision from the court, it is not enough to 
overcome the formal criteria, the acceptance of complaints is only granted, 
if the court finds that either the complainant has a legitimate interest in 
obtaining a decision,17 or the petition poses a question of fundamental 
significance.18 
The requirements of the acceptance of the constitutional complaint 
ought to be seen in combination with the procedural provisions of the 
preliminary scrutiny procedure. What should be pointed out here is, that 
the Act on the Hungarian Constitutional Court requires only “a short-cut 
reasoning”19 to the decision on dismissal, while the Federal Constitutional 
Court of Germany does not have to give any reason for the decision.0 
What makes the individuals’ situation worse, the competence of refusing 
a complaint considered as “obviously inadmissible” has been allocated to 
a single judge in Hungary.1
15 Art. 9 in connection with Art. 3 par. 1 of the FCC Act. For the praxis see maunz, schmidt-
BleiBtreu, Klein, Bethge: Bundesverfassungsgerichtgesetz. Kommentar. C. H. Beck 01, 
Line no. 54. See also Thomas Kreuder: Praxisfragen zur Zulässigkeit der Verfassungsbe-
schwerde. Neue Juristische Wochenschrift, 001, 143 ff.
16 Kreuder, Ibid 001, 148.
17 The Hungarian law stipulates that the Constitutional Court may accept the complaint if the 
judgement to be reviewed has been essentially determined by the imposed unconstitutionality 
in question. [Art. 29 of the HCC Act] According to the German rule concerned, the complain-
ant has to be accepted if the complainant would suffer especially grave disadvantage as a result 
of refusal to decide the case. [Art. 93a par. (2) point b) of the FCC Act] 
18 Art. 93a par.  point a) of the FCC Act and Art. 9 of the HCC Act.
19 Art. 56 par. 3 of the HCC Act.
0 Art. 93d par. 1 of the FCC Act.
1 Art. 55-56 of the HCC Act.
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As it was mentioned above, several features can be identified which 
demonstrate that the objective function of the constitutional complaint 
greatly surpasses its subjective character. One of the clear manifestations 
of the objective aspect of the complaint is the possibility of gaining a court 
decision also in cases that are of fundamental constitutional significance. 
The path to the constitutional court upon this basis has nothing to do with 
the question of whether a subjective right has been actually violated in a 
concrete case. It is aimed at providing the constitutional court with the 
option to establish and preserve constitutional standards and develop 
constitutional law regardless any personal legal interest. 
In several countries that have the constitutional complaint, the constitutional 
court is allowed, or at least not forbidden, to review not only the violation 
of those constitutional provisions to which the complainant referred, but 
also such aspects of the case that have not been alleged by him or her. The 
Federal Constitutional Court of Germany, for instance, has extended its 
scope of review not only beyond the fundamental rights violation claimed 
in the complaint but also to other norms or constitutional principles of the 
German Basic Law. As for Hungary, the Hungarian Constitutional Court 
may basically examine the case only to the extent it has been alleged 
by the complainant. However, there are two exceptions regarding the 
constitutional complaint from this rule. In case of complaints challenging 
legal norms, it is allowed to scrutinise beyond the petition, when otherwise 
the principle of legal certainty would get harmed.  In addition, if the 
complaint is brought to the court against a legal norm that was applied in 
the judicial procedure, the constitutional court may review not only the 
constitutionality of the norm itself but also the challenged decision (the 
application of laws), and vice versa.
In addition, in Hungary, the success of a complaint is not independent from 
“luck factors” either. As a result of the res iudicata effect of the original 
case, if the Hungarian Constitutional Court has already decided on the 
validity of a legal norm upon either a judicial initiative or a constitutional 
complaint challenging a court decision, further constitutional complaints, 
claiming the same legal provision on the same constitutional grounds, are 
 Art. 8 of the HCC Act.
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inadmissible. This limitation creates a kind of unfair competition among 
complainants since the court gives remedy only to the person who reached 
the court first. 
To sum up, all of the aforementioned characteristics lead us to conclude that 
the adjudication upon constitutional complaints is not a matter of individual 
right but rather of judicial discretion. The court only handles a case if there 
are particular important reasons to proceed. Accordingly, the constitutional 
complaint procedure tends to operate even more as an instrument to safeguard 
the objective constitutional order than to be a remedy for subjective right 
violations. As an instrument of objective right protection, the constitutional 
complaint represents a key institution to serve the interpretation and 
development of constitutional law, as well as the enhancement of respect 
for fundamental rights.
IV.  Conclusion
The original and main function of constitutional adjudication is the 
enforcement of the constitution against the laws. Regarding the replacement 
of the actio popularis with a German-type constitutional complaint, it can 
be stated that, as for the application of the laws, it broadens the function of 
the Constitutional Court: the control of the legislation will be supplemented 
by that of judiciary. Furthermore, it provides for an extraordinary legal 
remedy, however, its function as a means of subjective fundamental rights 
protection is pretty restricted, and the main reason for the introduction 
of the constitutional complaint is the advantage gained by the objective 
control and development of the jurisdiction.
By contrast, regarding the laws, the constitutional change does not transform 
or broaden the function of the Constitutional Court (namely the control of 
unconstitutional laws), but requiring the personal legal interest, it restricts 
the range of possible initiators, therefore less laws and only later can be 
brought before the Court. As for the protection of fundamental rights, due 
to the aforementioned restriction of initiators, the function of objective 
fundamental rights protection will also narrow down. The operation of 
the constitutional complaint as a means of subjective fundamental rights 
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protection is also accidental; it is only an additional effect of a review 
procedure initiated by an affected person (which did exist in Hungary 
in the last two decades in the form of a restricted or quasi constitutional 
complaint procedure).
The citizens (as initiators) are primarily the means and not the subjects or 
aims of the constitutional adjudication. The enforcement of their subjective 
fundamental rights is a secondary effect. In Hungary, the actio popularis 
was mainly the product of the transition to democracy which has made the 
citizens active participants in the process of the revision of the old legal 
system. It was abolished by the current constitutional changes stating that 
the constitutional complaint procedure will provide a more efficient way of 
judicial enforcement of individual fundamental rights: it can be submitted 
against the law itself as well as the application of the law; requiring the 
personal legal interest, the workload of the Constitutional Court will be 
reduced, meanwhile the real infringements of fundamental rights will be 
remedied, what’s more, in a more efficient way by a Court working more 
quickly. We have pointed out that it is only the appearance: the constitutional 
complaint procedure is essentially the means of the objective protection of 
fundamental rights as regards the application of the laws as well as the laws 
themselves. Regarding the latter, however, the constitutional complaint is a 
much more restrictive means than the actio popularis.
SUMMARY
Citizens’ Role in Constitutional Adjudication in Hungary:
From the Actio Popularis to the Constitutional Complaint
BERNADETTE SOMODY AND BEATRIX VISSY
The procedure of constitutional complaint is generally accompanied by 
the idea of performing the function of efficient individual human rights 
enforcement. In Hungary, the German-type constitutional complaint is 
introduced by the new Basic Law entering into force on the 1st of January 
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01. The constitutional change offers the occasion to analyse the 
benefits of this new competence of the Constitutional Court in the field 
of fundamental rights protection. Nevertheless, it seems that citizens had 
to pay a ‘high price’ for being able to submit a constitutional complaint: 
the actio popularis, a means proved to be outstandingly efficient in 
constitutional review in the last two decades, has been abolished. The 
paper focuses on the direct and indirect functions of the constitutional 
complaint mechanism. By doing so, the paper points out the shift of 
emphasis in the system of fundamental rights protection produced by the 
abovementioned changes. 
RESÜMEE
Die Rolle der Bürger in der Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit in 
Ungarn:
Von der Actio Popularis zur Verfassungsbeschwerde
BERNADETTE SOMODY UND BEATRIX VISSY
Die Verfassungsbeschwerde ist im Allgemeinen als ein Instrument im 
Interesse effektiven individuellen Grundrechtschutzes anerkannt. In 
Ungarn, das Verfahren der Verfassungsbeschwerde ist nach deutschem 
Vorbild ab dem 1. Januar 01 in das neue ungarische Grundgesetz 
aufgenommen worden. Die verfassungsrechtliche Änderung bietet 
Gelegenheit zu untersuchen, was durch diese geänderte Kompetenz des 
ungarischen Verfassungsgerichts zum Grundrechtschutz hinzugefügt 
wird. Dennoch scheinen die Bürgerinnen und Bürger einen „hohen Preis” 
für das neue Rechtsbehelf bezahlt zu haben: die Actio Popularis,  ein 
hochwirksames Mittel zur verfassungsrechtlichen Prüfung in den letzten 
zwei Jahrhunderten, wurde abgeschafft. Die Abhandlung konzentriert sich 
auf die direkten und indirekten Funktionen der Verfassungsbeschwerde. 
Dadurch wird die Verlagerung des Schwerpunkts in dem System des 
Grundrechtschutzes diskutiert.
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